Nos. 86-1288, 86-1342.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
February 25, 1988. Rehearing Denied April 14, 1988.
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Larry D. Newsome (George R. Salem, Robert N. Eccles, and Louis L. Joseph, Washington, D.C.; and William L. Lutz, U.S. Atty., and Ronald F. Ross, Asst. U.S. Atty., Albuquerque, N.M., with him on the brief), U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.
Charles C. Spann of Spann, Latimer Hollowwa, Albuquerque, N.M., for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
Before MOORE and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON, District Judge.[*]
JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.
[1] This appeal presents several questions applying the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) to specific transactions involving the Citizens Bank of Clovis Pension Plan. The district court held that Citizens Bank of Clovis (Bank) and the trustees of the Bank’s plan violated the diversification requirement and the prohibition against party-in-interest transactions contained in ERISA. The defendant Bank and the trustees appeal that decision. The court refused, however, to hold that ERISA’s self-dealing prohibition was violated when the trustees invested plan assets in permanent loans to third parties to whom the Bank had provided interim financing. On procedural grounds, the court also refused to require the defendant Bank to restore to the plan the interest it earned from the loans. The plaintiff Secretary appeals the latter two decisions. Our analysis leads us to conclude the trial court properly resolved all issues, and we affirm. [2] The plan for employees of the Bank has existed since 1958. In 1982, the Regional Administrator of the Department of Labor notified the trustees that eighty-five percent of the plan assets had been invested in real estate mortgages around Clovis, NewPage 346
Mexico. The Administrator contended these loans were an apparent violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C), which requires diversification of a plan’s investments. The Administrator warned the trustees to reduce the plan’s investment in real estate to thirty percent of its assets, or legal action might be taken. The trustees responded that all their investments were prudent and properly diversified. Unsatisfied with the response and concerned over other transactions, the Secretary filed this case.
[3] The Secretary’s complaint presented three issues to the district court. First, he argued the trustees’ alleged investment of over sixty-five percent of the plan’s assets in commercial real estate first mortgages violated the diversification requirements of § 1104.[1] Second, the Secretary alleged the trustees violated 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) when, on behalf of the plan, they borrowed money from the Bank. Third, he contended the trustees violated their fiduciary responsibilities when they made two loans to persons who used the proceeds to pay off previous loans from the Bank. The basic facts surrounding these issues were not in controversy. I.
[4] The trial court engaged in a lengthy and well-reasoned analysis of the diversification and loan issues constituting the appeal brought by the Bank and the trustees. We believe the court’s reasoning on these issues was flawless. In short, the trial court concluded the diversification requirement was not met essentially because the trustees had chosen to invest in “one type of security” which did not protect against a multitude of risks. The court further found that the trustees failed to establish the investments were prudent notwithstanding the lack of diversification. Both these conclusions are fully supported in the record, and we adhere to the trial court’s analysis.
II. A.
[7] Turning to the Secretary’s cross-appeal, we consider whether ERISA trustees are prevented from lending money to unrelated persons who thereafter use the loan proceeds to pay obligations to a party in interest. Precisely, we must decide whether 29 U.S.C. § 1106 was violated when the trustees approved loans from plan funds which permitted the borrowers to pay off interim financing they had received from the Bank.
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his inability to point to any provision of ERISA that specifically prohibits the transaction he complains of here, the Secretary argues the defendants committed a per se violation of the statute. We do not agree.
[9] Alleging the transactions in controversy are inherently suspicious, the Secretary argues around the absence of a specific prohibition in the statute. He states that the public interest in maintaining the integrity of employee retirement plans demands a strict prohibition of any dealings in which doubt may be cast upon the loyalty of the fiduciary. While we do not denigrate the validity of the Secretary’s concept of fiduciary responsibility, we are as unwilling as the district court to translate that concept into a per se violation when Congress has not done so. We agree with the district court that unless the act complained of falls within the specific list of dealings proscribed by § 1106 (or within the sole dealing provision of § 1104(a)(1)), the transaction does not constitute a per se violation of ERISA. [10] This is not to say the interjection of a third party into an otherwise prohibited transaction will sanitize an illegal dealing. Indeed, § 1106(a)(1) by its own terms applies to sham dealings by proscribing “indirect” transactions. Accordingly, if the Secretary could have proved that the loans to third parties were a sham to avoid application of § 1106(a), the transactions would have been prohibited transfers of plan assets. B.
[11] The Secretary’s attempt to avoid the burden of proving a violation of fiduciary duty underscores the absence of any specific ERISA provision upon which we can rely to find the transactions complained of constituted per se violations. He attempts to bridge this gap by suggesting that because the trustees were also employees of the Bank, they made the loans to protect their jobs. Hence, he contends the trustees violated § 1106(b) which forbids dealings between the fiduciary and the plan.
III.
[14] Finally, the Secretary contends the trustees should be required to return to the plan the amount of interest the plan paid to the Bank for the loans made in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B). Although the claim for recovery of such sums was set out in the pretrial order, it was not addressed in the trial court’s dispositional memorandum and order. Noting the court’s failure to deal with the claim, the Secretary filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) to amend the judgment to include, among other things, an order requiring reimbursement for the loan interest. Without discussing the merits of the motion,
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the court denied relief on the ground the motion was not timely. While the Secretary argues those merits in this court, he fails to address the reason why his motion was denied in the trial court. Perhaps that failure is due to the correctness of the ruling. Because the Secretary’s motion was not filed until thirteen days after entry of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court correctly denied relief on jurisdictional grounds. Beliz v. McLeod Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317
(5th Cir. 1985); Scott v. Younger, 739 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1984).
(D.N.J. 1980); Freund v. Marshall Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D.Wis. 1979); and Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341
(W.D.Okla. 1978). These cases are all distinguishable factually because in each the fiduciary dealt directly with either himself or a party in interest to commit a specifically prohibited act. In none of those cases was it contended a fiduciary committed a per se violation by dealing with a third party.