COPEMAN v. BALLARD, 214 Fed.Appx. 739 (10th Cir. 2006)

No. 05-7085.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
January 24, 2007.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

Eddie Kay Copeman, Forrest City, AR, pro se.

Jodi S. Casey, Andy A. Artus, Robert Ray Jones, Jr., Collins, Zorn, Wagner Gibbs, Allison J. Maynard, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office, Jennifer L. Wright, MS., Oklahoma Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before HARTZ, HOLLOWAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.[*]

ORDER AND JUDGMENT[**]

BOBBY R. BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Eddie Kay Copeman is spending thirty years in federal prison after a jury convicted him on one count of conspiracy with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine and six additional

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counts involving drug and firearms offenses. We affirmed Plaintiff’s (and his common-law wife’s/co-defendant’s) convictions on appeal. United States v. Blunt, 187 Fed.Appx. 821 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). The relevant facts are ably set out in our prior opinion and we need not repeat them here. Suffice it to say that following our decision, Plaintiff filed in the district court a post-conviction “Motion to Return Property” under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(g). Therein, Plaintiff sought the return of certain property which Oklahoma law enforcement officers seized during their underlying investigation. At the time, that same property (some of which we suggested in Blunt may have been improperly seized) was the subject of state judicial forfeiture proceedings In re 119 Head of Cattle, No. C-2002-209 (Haskell County, Okla. Dist. Ct., filed Nov. 1, 2002); In re 1998 Chevrolet Pickup, No. C-2002-232 (Haskell County, Okla. Dist. Ct., filed Dec. 9, 2002). We affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s Rule 41(g) motion, holding, among other things, that the state forfeiture proceedings provided Plaintiff with an adequate means for challenging the seizure United States v. Copeman, 458 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2006). Unbeknownst to us, the state court on December 10, 2004, had entered final orders directing forfeiture of the subject property. The orders specifically recognized Plaintiff as a respondent who was represented by counsel in the state proceedings.

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed the present § 1983 action in September 2004 (three months prior to entry of judgment in the state forfeiture proceedings) against those state officials allegedly responsible for the seizure of his property. According to Plaintiff, state law enforcement officials relied on false affidavits to obtain the warrants authorizing the seizure and then exceeded the scope and terms of the warrants in seizing everything but the kitchen sink.[1] What resulted, according to Plaintiff, was an unconstitutional seizure of his property. Plaintiff wants his property returned or, in the alternative, Defendants to pay him for it:

Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, Plaintiff’s are hereby requesting either the release or return of all property seized in regards to the warrants issued in Plaintiffs’ case . . . with reasonable compensation for any missing property and all storage fees and costs paid by the Defendants, or $2 million in compensatory relief.

Pltf’s Complaint ¶ 28. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants for a myriad of reasons. We now summarily dispose of Plaintiff’s appeal on the basis of res judicata.[2]

I.
A federal court must give to a state court judgment the same effect such judgment

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would have in the courts of that state. Thus, we need ascertain what preclusive effect, if any, Oklahoma courts would give to the aforementioned orders of forfeiture. See Fox v. Maulding, 112 F.3d 453, 456 (10th Cir. 1997). In Oklahoma, the doctrine of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, precludes a party to the prior action “from relitigating not only the adjudicated claim but also any theories or issues that were actually decided or could have been decided, in that action.” Wilson v. Kane, 852 P.2d 717, 722
(Okla. 1993) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments
(1982)).[3] In other words, res judicata bars not only relitigation of those issues that were or might have been offered to sustain the claim, but also all defenses that were or might have been offered to defeat the claim. See Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 291
(Okla. 1990); accord Fox, 112 F.3d at 458 (explaining that if plaintiffs had raised their claims in the prior action, “they may have been a complete defense”). Consistent with the foregoing, the Supreme Court has explained that a judgment on the merits “`is a finality . . . not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.'” Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30, 103 S.Ct. 2906, 77 L.Ed.2d 509
(1983) (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876)).[4]

To be sure, a party’s failure to allege certain facts either as a defense or as a counterclaim does not always preclude that party from relying on those facts in a subsequent action See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22 cmt. b (1982) (hereinafter “Restatement“). But where the successful pursuit of a federal claim based on such facts would undermine a prior state judgment or impair rights established thereby, such claim cannot survive application of res judicata principles. See Fox, 112 F.3d at 457-58 (applying Oklahoma preclusion principles and citing Restatement
§ 22(2)(b));[5] accord Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 654 F.2d 688, 691-92 (10th Cir. 1981). “Judicial economy is not the only basis for the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata also preserves the integrity of judgments and protects those who rely on them.” Martino v. McDonald’s Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 1979).

II.
Plaintiff’s complaint, his deposition testimony, and his response to Defendants’ motions

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for summary judgment make clear that he is challenging the seizure and forfeiture of what was formerly his property See, e.g., Pltf’s Combined Resp. to Defts’ Motions for Summary Judgment at 3 (“Plaintiff is suing the Defendants for seizing property that was not authorized by the warrants, which is a constitutional violation.”).[6] We say formerly because the legality of the forfeiture (and subsequent sale) undoubtedly was adjudicated, whether rightly or wrongly, in the prior Oklahoma state forfeiture proceedings. Whether Plaintiff actually challenged the lawfulness of the property’s seizure in those proceedings is irrelevant. The point is he should have if he did not because, as we explained in our prior opinion, Plaintiff “ha[d] an adequate remedy in state court.”Copeman, 458 F.3d at 1073. “That remedy is adequate because the legality of a seizure may be tested in a judicial forfeiture.” Frazee v. I.R.S., 947 F.2d 448, 450
(10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); accord United States v. Akers, 215 F.3d 1089, 1106 (10th Cir. 2000).

Allowing Plaintiff’s § 1983 action to go forward would clearly undercut the state district court’s judgment in the forfeiture proceedings. Defendant’s argument that an award of money damages in lieu of the property’s return would not in any way affect the state court’s judgments rings hollow. Even the district court, in the context of a discussion on th Rooker-Feldman doctrine, doubted Plaintiff’s assertion that he was not challenging the state court judgments.[7] In granting summary

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judgment to Defendants Fioretti and Craft, the court opined that “[t]he challenge of the . . . seizure, ipso facto, is a challenge to the state court’s forfeiture judgment.” Copeman v. Ballard, No. CIV-04-436-WH, Order at 5 (E.D. Okla., filed June 14, 2005). An award of compensatory damages based on the alleged value of the seized property, which is precisely what Plaintiff seeks if he cannot recover the property, would suggest the invalidity of the state court’s forfeiture orders. See Rudell v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 F.2d 926, 927-33 (7th Cir. 1986). This Oklahoma preclusion principles will not permit. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action is barred.[8]

AFFIRMED.