No. 82-1634.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 12, 1984.
Page 688
Julius L. Loeser, Chicago, Ill. (Jack B. Speight, Cheyenne, Wyo., on brief), for petitioner.
Kevin J. Handly, Washington, D.C. (J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Michael Bradfield, Gen. Counsel, Richard M. Ashton, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C., on brief), for respondent.
Appeal from the Federal Reserve Board.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and CHILSON,[*] District Judge.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
[1] Wyoming Bancorporation (Bancorp) appeals from the Federal Reserve Board’s denial under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (1982) (the Act), of its application to acquire control of the American National Bank of Powell in Powell, Wyoming (American Bank). The Board used Park County, Wyoming as the relevant geographical market within which it analyzed the competitive effects of the proposed acquisition. On appeal, Bancorp asserts that the Board erred as a matter of law in its delineation of the relevant market, and that it failed to provide substantial evidence to support its decision. We affirm.I. [2] BACKGROUND
[3] As is required by section 1842(a)(3) of the Act, Bancorp applied to the Federal Reserve Board for approval of its proposed acquisition of 80 percent of the voting shares of American Bank. The Board denied Bancorp’s application under section 1842(c)(2), which requires disapproval of any proposed acquisition “whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition.”
Page 689
[6] Bancorp does not dispute the Board’s conclusion that effects like these within a properly-defined geographical market might warrant denying an application, but it argues that Park County is the wrong geographical market. First, Bancorp asserts that the Board erred as a matter of law because it relied improperly on evidence of the general commercial interaction between Cody and Powell when it defined the relevant geographical market. Second, even if use of this evidence is proper, Bancorp contends the Board’s order lacks substantial evidence that Park County is the relevant geographical area. II. PROPER EVIDENCE
[7] When defining the relevant geographical market, the “question to be asked . . . is not where the parties to the merger do business or even where they compete, but where, within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate . . . . This depends upon `the geographic structure of supplier-customer relations.'” United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1738, 10 L.Ed.2d 915 (1963) (citations omitted). More specifically, “the `area of effective competition in the known line of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.‘” Id. at 359, 83 S.Ct. at 1739 (quoting Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327, 81 S.Ct. 623, 628, 5 L.Ed.2d 580 (1961), and adding emphasis); see also United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 668, 94 S.Ct. 2788, 2796, 41 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1974); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 619, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 2868, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974) United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 362, 90 S.Ct. 2035, 2042, 26 L.Ed.2d 658 (1970).
Page 690
418 U.S. at 622, 94 S.Ct. at 2870; see also Connecticut, 418 U.S. at 667-68, 94 S.Ct. at 2795-96; Phillipsburg, 399 U.S. at 363-64, 90 S.Ct. at 2043; Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 1738. This localization of banking arises for a variety of reasons, but the factor most often emphasized is inconvenience. “The factor of inconvenience localizes banking competition as effectively as high transportation costs in other industries.” Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 1738 see also Connecticut, 418 U.S. at 667-68, 94 S.Ct. at 2795-96 Phillipsburg, 399 U.S. at 362-63, 90 S.Ct. at 2042-43. However, what may be inconvenient to a bank customer in an urban area, who has many alternatives for banking and other services in the immediate vicinity, may not be inconvenient to a customer in a small rural town who is accustomed to traveling long distances to obtain basic services.[3] Thus, the extent to which the residents of Cody and Powell are accustomed to traveling to each other’s towns for certain services is relevant to the basic issue of whether residents of Cody and Powell can “practicably turn” to banks in the other town as an alternative to banking in their own town. The Board’s use of this evidence as a factor in its decision is not reversible error.
[11] Of course, the Board could not rely exclusively upon such data in delineating the relevant banking market, see Connecticut, 418 U.S. at 670, 94 S.Ct. at 2797, and it did not. The Board also considered evidence of actual competition between American Bank and Cody Bank. According to the Board’s findings, American Bank derived 4 percent of its deposits and 8.7 percent of its loans from Cody residents, while Cody Bank derived 4.3 percent of its deposits and 2.7 percent of its loans from Powell residents. While neither bank advertised in the newspaper or on the radio of the other town, 13 percent of the Powell newspaper circulation was in Cody and both of the local radio stations could be received in either town. Finally, the Board compared the interest rates charged on loans by each bank over a fifteen-month period. The Board found it significant that, “in 14 of 15 periods cited the changes in rates where [sic] in the same direction or caused the rates to converge.” Rec., vol. IV, at 789. The Board concluded from this evidence “that some customers in each town have found it practical to do banking business in the other town and that there is existing competition between the two banks.”Id. at 788. [12] To determine the areas where the banks involved operated, the Board considered record evidence relating to where the banks were located, where they drew their deposits and loans, and where they marketed their services. See id. at 785, 788-89; cf. Phillipsburg, 399 U.S. at 363, 90 S.Ct. at 2043 (giving criteria for locating where the seller operates). To determine where the banks’ customers could practicably turn for alternative banking services, the Board examined the proximity of Cody and Powell and the relative convenience of travel between them for residents seeking essential services. See rec., vol. IV, at 786-88; cf. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336-37, 82 S.Ct. at 1529-30 (“Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one.”).Page 691
[13] We conclude that the Board applied the proper legal standard in defining the relevant geographical area, and looked to appropriate evidence in applying that standard. We turn now to whether the Board’s decision to use Park County as the relevant market is supported by substantial evidence. III. [14] SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
[15] The findings of the Board are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1982). Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence “`a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the Board’s] conclusion.'” Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 253, 99 S.Ct. 505, 515, 58 L.Ed.2d 484 (1978) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). We have reviewed the entire record, and we cannot say that a reasonable mind would not accept the evidence cited by the Board as adequate to support its conclusion that Park County is the relevant geographical market.[4]